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Metareflection on decisions concerning career choice

Abstract

In the article, the author presents the main theses of his *Psychologia dążeń i skłonności zawodowych (Psychology of Vocational Strivings and Inclinations, Jarosiewicz, 2012)*. Empirically grounded, the study draws on career counselling practice, in particular on the provision of career diagnosis on the basis of multiple-choice tests (Achnich, 2010). Analysing the assumptions behind such qualitative techniques, the author comes to distinguish the phenomenon of choice as such within a wider group of decision-making processes. He defines “choice” as settling on the object of wanting. Choice-making is informed by a person’s prior experiences and desires crystallized as strivings. A person tends to choose what s/he finds personally suitable, because the role of choice consists in subjective directing of one’s activity, that is in self-directing. The author contrasts the subjectivity of choices with the objectivity of decisions, and even with their objectivism in their role of directing things.

Key words: choice, decision, strivings, intrinsic/autotelic relations, professional career

Introduction

The phenomenon of decision is associated with something objective. Decisions are thought out and preceded by the decision making process and the assessment of presented arguments. Choices do not have to stem from the decision-making process — sometimes asking for a spontaneous choice we see certain advantage in having no reflection, which allows the choice to be more authentic. Judgments are made

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in such cases quite differently. The attention is drawn then to “the heart” which is the cause of choices or, in other words, the involuntary maker of choices. It seems that the language itself does not allow to make choices nothing but decisions. One cannot decide on fate — one chooses one’s fate. We decide in the price of a car, but we choose its color. It is clumsy to say that we decide on tastes we like.

Even though the choice is spontaneous, it cannot be defined as a reaction to a stimulus. In making a choice you yield to certain desires, which directs the subject outwards, like in reactions to a stimulus. A choice can be compared to a source, as just like a source creates a river, a choice creates human life. Understood in this way, life is not created by reactions to stimuli, but is a transition from potency to an act, which depends on certain conditions.

Choices, hesitations, conflicts – these are the phenomena which have been given to us as a starting point to reflect on human life. Being a human means choosing. Choices shape the fate, including the career.

In this text I do not use the terms such as decision and choice interchangeably but I differentiate between them. In other words, we can talk about choices, which are not decisions and about decisions, which are not choices. However, usually complex correlations exist between them. They can be complementary or contradictory. In the complementary approach, a choice leads to disintegration of existing structures and to the maturing of the subject, and the complementing decision enables another integration on the functional level. In the contradictory approach, a choice hinders decisions and making a decision hinders a choice. The choice of a certain fate distances certain situations (impressions) and related active actions as inconsistent with the subject’s personal experience (emotions) and strivings (tendency to introversion). However, undertaking certain situational actions cuts off certain choices, since the desires are inconsistent with what the person considers important in their image of the world (tendency to extraversion).

Therefore, decisions alike choices appear in various contexts of the psychologist’s activity, require different cognitive approaches, and consequently result in psychological activity.

Main body

Career counseling

Career counseling is a part of broader life counseling (Kulczycki, 1980). Observing life activity, Kulczycki distinguishes a group of career problems and indicates activities which ensure material security, building quality relationships with peers and career development.




Fig. 1: Explanation via sufficient conditions




Fig. 2: Explanation via necessary conditions

The work of the counselor involves a way of thinking which K. Ajdukiewicz described as pragmatic logic, i.e. life logic (Ajdukiewicz, 1965). The counselor is not an experimenter who learns sufficient conditions to exert a specific influence on their customer (behavioral engineering); Figure 1. The counselor does not give simple advice saying “You should do this or that” or “Be proactive” (Covey, 2006) to achieve their aims, that is the expected state of affairs.

The counselor describes their own empirical observations in sentences called *explanandum*, i.e. accepted a priori; Figure 2. To explain this state of affairs it is required to refer to certain subjective conditions, which the counselor justifies by the accepted model of the person. The counselor is an expert on human life and working life, a specialist who knows the conditions necessary in professional activity. As a specialist who explains the client how do deal with life, they would rather say: ”I will help to ensure that you have what is necessary in devel-

opment; (1) get necessary information, complete a school, go to a certain college, (2) practice specific skills, participate in training; (3) take into consideration your predispositions which define your resistance to stress and requirements for certain work atmosphere, your temperament and character, thus your strivings; (4) take into account your tendencies, so the relations that you spontaneously choose for yourself, that is analyze your personality”.

The world of necessary conditions opens before the counselor at the moment in which the client's complaint appears. The complaint is not a question or even a grumble about pain. Its essence lies in information on a bad life situation, absence of desired quality of life (Kulczycki, 1998).

Career counselor not only deals with hearing out complaints of those clients who cannot cope with their professional activity, but is also invited to cooperation with a client. Working with a client consists of explaining the mechanism of formation of difficult career problems to them. One of the four groups of conditions (as defined above) necessary for coping with problems is properly ordered information. Explanation offered by the counselor to their client is based on reduction to the category of relation. It is so because relations are experienced spontaneously as good/bad life situation. The client copes with their life if they can constantly optimize their relations, which means that they can provide themselves with proper conditions necessary for development. Within this meaning, life is understood as “organized and developing activity” (Kulczycki, 1985b)

This is why these phenomena must be explained in a way that enables the client to make the necessary professional decisions and choices on their own. This is how complex activities known as “problem solving” are formed, with regards to which “aims”, “ways” in which they are accomplished and the context of circumstances, in which such aims and ways of their accomplishment are formed can be differentiated. Accomplishment requires acquisition of proper (2) skills understood as action techniques.

It should be emphasized that “aims” category is not the equivalent of “state of affairs” here. As shown in Figures 1 and 2 - development is the process of change, which means directional transition of the subject from state A to some state B. The client is usually rather willing to choose state B₂, than the current state B₁. Why is that so? On the one hand it can be claimed, that it is the situation that brings various values and possibilities, which lead to formation of various task situations, i.e. tension between state B₁ and state B₂ ((Tomaszewski, 1979). On the other hand, there are phenomena that can generally be described as strivings. They make a person chooses B₂ state as desired. So it sees in its conception M. Kulczycki (Kulczycki, 1998) and J. Koziellecki in transgressive conception of man (Koziellecki, 1987).

Koziellecki differentiates between heterostatic motivation, which forces the person to “set off in search of something” and homeostatic motivation, when the person wants to “come back” to a particular state which they found to be optimal. He also introduces the category of will in his analysis². He specifies two types of heterostatic motives: hubristic motivation, which belongs to the world of human desires, seeing “striving for confirmation and growth of one’s own importance” (1987, p. 175) in it, and cognitive motivation. He stresses that “they create certain entirety, just as two banks of the same river do” (1987, p. 201). I enter into the subject of human strivings indicated not only by J. Koziellecki, but also by M. Kulczycki and K. Obuchowski (Obuchowski, 2000), and I transfer developed applications to the field of vocational guidance (Jarosiewicz, 2012).

Obviously, it is not easy to differentiate straight away between task tension and aspiration, which becomes a tendency to choose certain relations as more valuable for oneself (the first is cognitive motivation, the second — hubristic). Differentiation between those two and drawing some universal conclusions are the purposes of this article.

Activity and development — intrinsic relations

While discussing strivings and choices, we are dealing with phenomena which are experienced commonly, as every single person feels their strivings, yet completely unknown or – to name it more precisely – forgotten³. After all, these phenomena are very important for every human being, as they constitute sources of human activity and allow us to understand the specificity of aims we define in our lives.

As an active career counselor I have been observing development of professional careers for years, now. I can firmly state that lack of insight into the world of one’s own desires and strivings makes the contemporary human, especially the young one, who enters the labor market to behave like a sailor in the storm, who either has no compass or is not able to read it. Even if they >oar< efficiently, which means they have experience in execution of certain instrumental activities brought by the labor market, they cannot decide which activities are proper for

² “One cannot ignore the fact that each transgression and its intentions are born in the mind of an individual and constitute an expression of its will. (...) A transgressionalist is interested in the first place in an expansive and creative individual, who (...) thanks to their actions becomes someone they can be, but they are not yet” (Koziellecki, 1987, page 12-13).

³ Ever since K. Obuchowski published his “Psychology of human strivings” in 1966, desires as direct reflex or human need have not become subject of any serious research or theoretical reflection.

them, and will allow them to develop their own talents and improve their quality of life. The Socratic saying “know your own self” is still relevant today!

That is why I stress the importance of intrinsic relations, seeing in them the conditions necessary for human development. It was T. Tomaszewski that suggested the *q u a l i t a t i v e* distinction of relations which regulate human behavior (Tomaszewski, 1979).

It only seemingly looks like conformism. Conformism means that the group influences the person. In the case discussed here – the person participates in the life of the group by him or herself. Thanks to these choices the person does not loose oneself but just the opposite — becomes oneself. It is so, because one’s activity ceases to be directed by tasks and begins to be regulated by experiences and desires. This is why we can say that intrinsic values are relations that constitute condition of a person’s development, some *arche* of a person’s becoming oneself.

Thanks to this distinction, within the wide area of decision-making processes, in which judgments appear, we can specify a more narrow group called choices, in which the reason for judgment is the very subject.

Choices

Choice of way of conduct

The fundamental subject of analysis are choices through which any person actively participates in the course of life, which means that they also participate in events taking place in the labor market. Such participation will not take form of action from the very beginning. Thanks to experiences a person can work out certain *d i s t a n c e* to their own actions and is able not only to control themselves, but also decide for themselves.

Personalistic thinking stresses the importance of moment in which decision is made, as thanks to making decisions every human acts *per se*, which means “for themselves”. Marian Kulczycki states that the function of a decision is subjective directing of one’s activity (Kulczycki, 1990)⁴.

In my research I differentiate between the choice of object of wanting (**I want** – this) and other processes, i.e. deciding on the subject of known objects and the result of which - in the process of subjectivization (internalization) - is wanting of an object, meaning a state of will (its act), which finds the object present in the process of decision-making to be the aim of action (**this** – is what I want).

⁴ “A person must (...) decide not only about dynamizing one’s own subject (...). They must also decide about the object towards which they direct their actions. And this is the decision, in terms of deciding on the object of wanting, which can be named choice” (Wojtyła, 1994, p. 176).

The aim here is some state of affairs which is possible to be achieved (cause to happen), and the arising desire is named task tension.

There is a fundamental difference between the state of subject and their strivings, which urges them to change their way of conduct, and the new state of affairs, which urges them to a particular way of acting to achieve it. Even though it may sound quite paradoxically, choices (decisions involving objects of wanting) are not about deciding on the aim itself, but deciding⁵ on the way in which it will be achieved. In the case of activity that we define as “problem solving”, the non-reflected aim is the very subject and their actualization/development in a better life situation. Therefore we will say: “Choose yourself, and everything else – having yourself in mind”.

This is why it is justified to talk about **decisions** defining aims of action in the case of any material activity, meaning activity involving creation of objects. In this case the value of particular aim is defined by its usefulness. Aims of this type define heterostatic motivation of cognitive type. In **choices** which define objects of wanting we define person's manner, meaning their conduct. It is heterostatic motivation of hubristic type. The very “being” itself, meant as person's existence, is beyond reflection.

Choice of way of being

Can this unique aim of state of subject be objectivized and reflected? It is the task of self-knowledge which answers the questions: „Who am I?” and „Who can I be?”, instead of merely answering the questions: „What to do?” or: „How to be?”.

The third group of decision-making processes defines the shape of being, i.e. personal ideal. As a result the person wants to be such, as created mentally by themselves, they literally intentionally exist in the object (vision) created by themselves. This is the essence of moral work in which a person decides not only about the way of conduct, but also about the way of being. The product of self-determination is will as person's property, not power (Wojtyła, 1994).

Since participation constitutes a natural context for axiological judgments, the first perception of oneself is the product of reasoning by analogy (Biela, 1981).

⁵ The very Greek name itself: PROAIRESIS seems to indicate that a decision is a choice of certain things with omission of others”, within the scope of “measures leading to the aim” (Aristoteles, 1996)..

Complementarity of decisions

Complementarity of choices and decisions

Complementarity of choices and decisions lies in the fact that in the course of developmental process intrinsic relations mature and complement each other through instrumental actions. Generally, instrumental relations – meaning various objects of action - are wanted (or desired) due to intrinsic relations. Known motivators define directions of wanting, but do not replace wanting itself, understood as an act of will.

Complementary (in relation to choices) decisions appear at various levels of subject's activity. The basic objects of wanting are all the things that influence the state of an organism (create favorable conditions for its h o m e o s t a s i s); in order to upkeep this state the subject turns to various elements of situation, which become motives of instrumental actions necessary for growth and functioning of the body. The point here is for example in providing food. Such objects trigger spontaneous choices. The material products of those choices are various behaviors experienced as bodily feelings.

Intrinsic relations mature because human being depends not only on the state of their organism, but also on relation with social environment. As a matter of fact, a change in the state of an organism usually does not take place due to one's own directional action but due to experiencing of other persons actions, that is by participation in relations of dependence. A simple manifestation of this fact is participation in the culture of the table, which is expressed in the qualitatively new way of satiation of hunger. The product of participation is the fact that a human learns how to yield to certain relations and be knowledgeable about them; this is where their sensitizing lies. It is thanks to experiencing of cultural values that qualitatively new objects of wanting appear. They also trigger spontaneous choices but they are not an expression of striving to homeostasis of nature, but to h e t e r o s - t a s i s connected with participation in culture. These are the behaviors that are experienced as social feelings.

Genesis of this type of behaviors (feelings) is not situational. These are not tasks but p r o b l e m s to be solved. Behavior, as stressed by A. Lewicki, „does not mean a “reaction” to “stimulus”, like in behaviorism, but an act controlled by a person, aimed at execution of some purpose important for the person or avoiding of a threat.” (Lewicki, 1978, p. 16).

The ability of will to participate in the world of goods/values is conditioned by sensory sensitivity to experience values (intrinsic relations). Whereas the ability

of intellect to create motives as “objects of wanting” is conditioned by cognition (“wishful thinking”): see Figure 3.




Fig. 3: Complementarity of choice and decision

Spontaneous choices applicable to objects of wanting are expressed in tasks which are a way of being. Only objective reflection on oneself and one’s life (so-called integration problems) leads to formation of a mature ideal of being. The subject exists at the time (obviously only intentionally) in a mental object („thinking wanting”).

Cognition does not always fulfill the experience in a complementary way. The contents of cognition can generate only situational decisions and tasks. These tasks can be subjectivized in the process of internalization („wanting of an object”) and the aim becomes created. In both cases (ideal of being, aim) we come across an act of will. Will is the person’s ability to control oneself, which actualizes in the moment of participation, and cognitive motives define the „way” of participation. But will can also be „used” for execution of aims, which is a common phenomenon, as work is a free activity, not only directional. Those two ways of engagement of will, in both — dependence and instrumental — relations need to be differentiated with regards to their mechanism (which has already been proven) and experience. Experience of participation and causative power is qualitatively different from experience of purpose of one’s own action.

The activity of choice is explained in reference to will. Will constitutes a specific dynamism, which cannot be excluded in description of mechanisms of acting and reduce the explanation of person’s activity in the labor market to mere moti-

vators and cognitive motivation, which defines aims. Experience of participation as activity of one's own will is felt as „wanting” and is preserved as **aspiration**, which was defined by Koziński as intentions of a person referring to “confirmation and growth of one's own importance”.

Disturbances of complementarity: objectivism and subjectivism

Sometimes there are decisions which are not choices and choices, which are not complemented by decisions.

As a result of the so-called instrumental conditioning of reactions motivators appear, which in turn trigger decisions, meant as resolutions pertaining to the object of action. Thanks to this the subject acts on things and their task acting reminds reactions to stimuli. In fact they are not reactions but behaviors experienced as sensory feelings. We are dealing here with heterostatic motivation of cognitive type, not experiential motivation, as in the case of social feelings.

In professional development instrumental values complement intrinsic values. Whereas in purely productive activity situational tasks play fundamental role. Cognitive motivation meant as influence of motives on will appears. Within the will itself „wanting of an object” appears. In this case the will does not choose those motives as objects of wanting but yields to them. In this case one „uses” their will to execute productive tasks in return for remuneration. It poses a threat of „automating” one's behavior (Adler, 1986) and instrumental treatment of a human being, or even self-utilitarianism. „Objectivism” is a situation in which instrumental relations (values) appear beyond intrinsic relations and are „found” to be one's own good (axiological judgment).

On the other hand, sometimes it also happens that experience of relation of dependence appears without complement in particular motivators and without choice of objects of wanting, that is instrumental relations. Active participation consists in the fact that some way of living given by the culture is spontaneously chosen as own „object of wanting” and then executed. The choice includes „ways” of being, which define the conduct and are ancillary with regards to personally experienced values.

One must remember that these values are experienced and become the source of activity, but are not deciphered right away (the good they express is unknown). They are however felt, thanks to which the so-called “wishful thinking” is created, that is “thinking for values”. The condition required for feeling and choice is experience of values, that is sensitizing, and the condition for directing of one's conduct is objectivizing of values, that is searching for objects of wanting. The product of choice is one's own behavior, which is experienced as bodily and social feelings. Experience of values bears fruit in the form of rich emotional life.

The evidence of moral maturity are axiological judgments, in which the subject defines not only way of conduct, but also the very aim towards which this conduct leads, that is the ideal of being. The created ideal is “considered” to be one’s own, the product of which is wanting of an object, whereas the subject exists intentionally in created object/ideal/aim.

Experience by nature results in turning to oneself, to one’s own „ego”, which experiences the value and – in consequence – to the value itself. This is subjectivity that is natural for a person. Yet, a strong experience virtually turns one’s attention away from relation and from value and makes it focus on itself. Then the experience of value is moved aside by the value of experience and subjectivism appears, that is the primacy of one’s own sensitivity. The value of experience is reduction to the state of the sense itself. The experience itself cuts away participation and causes egocentrism. The value of mere experiences, whether it is pleasure and desire of it, or discomfort and avoidance of it, gives rise to emotionalizing of consciousness. Emotionalizing means a change in a person’s state under influence of emotions, tenderness and excitement.

Typology of decisions

Let’s collect those analyses into conclusions pertaining to the issue of decision-making activities (defined as deciding):

(1) Decisions become *trivialized* if they concern only objects of action. Sensory feelings are dominant, as a result of which instrumentalism (functionalism), or even self-utilitarianism appears. In the case of objectivism we are dealing with judgments, which lead to subjectivization of things as aims, in which a way of being and fulfillment is seen.

(2) Decisions are *subjective* if the value of experience disturbs the choice of object of wanting. In the case of subjectivism we are dealing with a lack of self-knowledge efficiency, which under the influence of experience of pleasure ceases to involve relations (values) and focuses on the pleasure itself. A possibility appears that the experience will be considered a value by the person and will be turned it into an axiological aim. Axiological judgment (and its product — the ideal of being) becomes displaced by hedonistic judgment (the ideal of experience). A pleasant way of being becomes the aim.

(3) Decisions are deep and personally important choices if decision-making includes objects of wanting. Then the aim — being essentially satisfaction of one’s desires — is complemented by a particular way of its execution. Ways are exposed to situational changes, whereas desires are more permanent.

Apart from trivialized and subjective decisions there are decisions, which have some elements of “compulsion”: (4) In the first step the object itself “forces” to be

considered the aim of action. Action becomes “automated”, as A. Adler noted. (5) In the second case sensation and experience are so powerful that they are accompanied by the choice of any appearing object. These are the situations in which “a starving human would eat anything”.

Conditions necessary and sufficient for activity

Spontaneous choices of „objects of wanting” are made under the influence of experiences, desires and preserved strivings of a person. Such strivings are personal and therefore *c e r t a i n*, but usually they are not clear. Whereas “objects of wanting” included in decision-making are *c l e a r*, their value for the subject is debatable (the issue of assessment of “subjectively expected usefulness” (Lewicka, 1993).

For this very reason it is necessary to subject the world of strivings (“heart”) to cognitive analysis. The object of psychology as empirical science is “objective subjectivity”, that is knowledge of subject *a s t h e s u b j e c t*. Then we learn how to think, that is how to draw conclusions about phenomena connected with participation and choice. It requires referring in our analyses to the so-called necessary conditions of human activity.

The necessary conditions to which we refer in explaining of what we are given in our observation as existing (explanandum) are subjective phenomena (Ajdukiewicz, 1965). Their nature is psychological, not physiological; they are not bodily, though they are connected to body. So they are given on the way of thinking as such. In the perspective presented by K. Twardowski they are activities and mental products which explain material products, that is behavior (Twardowski, 1965b). Conditions necessary are shown as rational hypotheses which are subjected to falsification procedures (Lewicka, 1993).

The natural way of learning about the subjective world is not “positive” description of sufficient conditions, which result in a change in other conditions (so-called dependent conditions), but “negative” sentences which define the necessary conditions on which the subject depends.

Sentences appropriate for explanatory thinking are sentences of the following type: **without participation we do not observe engagement of will**, which is written down as:

$$\text{non-p} \rightarrow \text{non-q}$$

Or also as: **without will there are no choices**, as everywhere, where we come across choices the experience of causality connected with will appears.

Therefore we may conclude that where a choice happens, an act of will takes place as well:

$$q \rightarrow p$$

The following sentence is a completely different observation:

$$p \rightarrow q$$

in which it is stated that it is enough to pay to make a human want to work. So the problem of work is the issue of financial motivation. These are sentences of the *demonstrandum* type: they determine the conditions sufficient for causing certain results, which do not exist yet, as they depend on other conditions, external with regards to the subject (remuneration).

The researcher is certain of necessary conditions, though they cannot overestimate the role of will in action. It is not enough to want (necessary condition), as it is also necessary to define the objects of wanting (condition sufficient, though other than money).

Drawing conclusions on the basis of necessary conditions (as well as sufficient) is threatened by two errors, known as denying the antecedent and affirming the consequent:

Though we may observe that the lack of will means the lack of choice, the conclusion stating that the mere will enables choice is denying the antecedent (fallacy).

It is true that $\text{non-p} \rightarrow \text{non-q}$
but it is not justified to think: $p \rightarrow q$

The will itself is not a sufficient condition! Action requires also sufficient conditions, as choice always includes some objects of wanting.

Drawing conclusions including sufficient conditions is clear. But errors appear also here.

Will defines motives of action and constitutes a condition for decision, which “activates” will. Yet, drawing a conclusion that something is good because it >activates< will is affirming the consequent and founds pragmatism. Even though it is true that an object allows for action, the mere undertaking of action does not prove that without this knowledge there would be no action.

It is true that: $p \rightarrow q$
but it is not justified to think: $q \rightarrow p$

Since knowledge (p) is not a necessary condition, it does not constitute any good (something considered in terms of human nature).

This is why we can say that even though knowledge (sufficient condition) is necessary for taking a decision (and directional action), deliberate action requires an act of will as necessary condition, not only a motive. Motive only/as much as directs the activity of will.

This is why even though sometimes circumstances force a decision to undertake certain instrumental actions (market actions), a person does not choose it as their own good, but decides to do what is “required” by the situation.

Life is not a laboratory in which one can experiment to find the conditions which allow for obtaining of intended results, which is exemplified by sentences to be proven, i.e. *demonstrandum*. In humanistic thinking, i.e. in pragmatic logic, we make an attempt to explain things that life itself brings to us. This is how the so-called observational sentences, i.e. *explanandum* are formed.

In humanistic optics we claim that a relation of participation in a good on which the subject depends (necessary condition) is sufficient for an act of will to appear. Such conditions are not as numerous as sufficient conditions. It is for example oxygen necessary for breathing, but also a language as **culture** in its broad sense, in which a person participates.

Non-contradictory reasoning we have presented above says in this case, that without participation in a good (non-p) there is no activity of will (non-q). So everywhere where we can see deep engagement, experience of causative power in which the subject experiences their own subjectivity, we conclude that these are relations (p) proper for a particular person,

$$q \rightarrow p$$

So a person aspires to relations which are proper for them. Typical relations define typical characters, as engagement of will is the essence of character. Without the possibility of participation in certain relations a person with a particular type of character feels bad.

One cannot say the same about tasks which are executed with competence.

Even if $p \rightarrow q$ the task results in engagement
it is not true that $\text{non-}p \rightarrow \text{non-}q$

Because these are not necessary conditions. From mere undertaking of situational tasks one cannot conclude that these are the tasks necessary for a given person, i.e. that these are relations of dependence (denying the antecedent).

One cannot conduct experiments on necessary conditions. The “method” lies in observation, which has to be performed in a long-term perspective. Drawing conclusions requires great caution here.

Lack of development of activity in particular relations of dependence (participation) does not mean that it is not the activity proper for a given person (affirming the consequent); what we also need are certain sufficient conditions.

Although it is true that $\text{non-}p \rightarrow \text{non-}q$ (without will there is no activity)

it is not true that $\text{non-}q \rightarrow \text{non-}p$

Because participation is not a sufficient condition, undertaking of an objective action requires proper motives. Firstly, the person acting must “want to”. Secondly, they must find a way of execution of this wanting, which is not always easy.

Hastiness in making judgments can result in expelling of a genius from a university just because he is not efficient enough (the case of Einstein).

In our everyday activity passive participation in other persons' actions turns naturally into active participation, which is expressed in instrumental actions, but cannot be limited to these actions.

A choice is a decision on the object of wanting. Sometimes "wanting" is completely unclear, so we are surprised that someone chooses this and not other object, which seems to be irrational. In fact it is rational, yet these are not reasons of intellect but peculiar "reasons" of will. As B. Pascal claimed: "the heart has its reasons". In literature this type of "reasons" is called internal motivation (non-material).

Choices and strategies of career counseling

Two strategies of counseling

In connection with differentiating between decisions and choices as well as two types of conditions for activity (relations of dependence and instrumental relations), two types of diagnosis can be defined and – in consequence – two strategies of career counseling. The first one is connected with emphasizing conditions sufficient for activity, the other – conditions necessary.

The strategy which emphasizes the importance of sufficient conditions states, that it is the lack of proper motivators that results in lack of engagement, so one must pay attention to motives of action. The importance of activity as opposed to reactivity is stressed here, by formulating the principle: „be proactive”.

In the first place sufficient conditions mean knowledge, as having knowledge defines what can become an instrumental relation. Since I know, I can act; „knowing means being able to act”.

Emphasizing the importance of necessary conditions should by no means be interpreted as negation of knowledge and instrumental actions. I only stress the fact that limiting oneself to analysis of task situations means reduction to the world of interaction, to relation of mutual interaction of the subject and the world. Meanwhile, experience of dependence is a phenomenon different in terms of quality in comparison with yielding to functioning of the world, and participation is something different than undertaking one's own action.

This is why I pay attention to the second group of relations, which has escaped our notice. I mean the relation to conditions, the fulfillment of which is necessary for development and relations of healthy participation (not conformism!).

The second strategy stresses the importance of necessary conditions, that is intrinsic relations, for activity. Certainly, participation in these relations is not an action yet. However, it guarantees growth and maturing. In the case of normal course of affairs, participation in the world of values opens to sufficient conditions, as one always chooses objects of wanting, not „sheer” good.

Following this course of reasoning, that is calling for complementarity of these relations, I would like to propose a thesis that the essence of enterprise lies in undertaking of instrumental actions for the known and recognized intrinsic values (non-material motives). If we claim that one should act *per se*, that is for oneself, it means in practice: for one’s own deep desires and strivings. A subject present in the labor market is perceived analogically, as an investor who deposits their assets in the labor market; first they choose a proper professional niche, then undertake active objective actions.

Intrinsic relations open the world of “heart” and will.

The importance of will

Will is not discussed much these days in psychology. It has been reduced to motivation (Kreutz, 1935), which means reductionism to sufficient reasons. In counseling strategy suggested herein, referring to conditions necessary for professional success, will is perceived as a peculiar phenomenon. In classic understanding proposed by W. James it is presented as empirical “I” in the form of experience of causative power (it is a spiritual “I”). In my perspective, the product of acts of will is the world of preserved aspirations. Without >reading< of these aspirations, that is without knowledge of one’s own good (lack of self-knowledge), one does not choose objects of wanting appropriate for those desires, even though there are many potential motives in one’s environment. As Słowacki accurately observes: “they could have a lot, but they refuse to want”. One should say: “Choose yourself, and everything else – having yourself in mind”.

Self-knowledge and choices

In decision we can see some center of deciding about things and situations. It is also a center of self-determination and foundation for person’s freedom. The function of decision is subjective directing of activity in the following meaning: not only „through” the subject but also „for” the subject (*per se*). The essence of undertaking actions “for oneself” is basing the decision on person’s strivings! The subjective directing of one’s activity is determined not as much by assessment of usefulness of actions, but by self-knowledge, its development. It plays crucial role in professional development (Czerwińska-Jasiewicz, 1997).

The expression of efficient self-knowledge is transition from experience of values itself to “seeing” the relation. In methodical academic reflection it takes form of concept of problem solving (Kulczycki, 1985).

Climate and culture of organization

Advanced understanding of organizational climate is connected with experience and feeling of one’s own life situation. The situation is defined by culture in which the subject lives and participates. A human can choose the culture they find attractive instinctively, simply following one’s experience, that is experienced climate. Focus on climate means a turn towards subjectivity, whereas focus on culture results in a turn towards things that exist objectively, towards values/good in which the employee participates.

Qualitative diagnosis

Considering of the above findings to be valuable in career counseling, one must acknowledge those diagnostic methods which allow for recognition of deep conditioning of choices. They allow for defining of that towards which human aspires („wants”), not only that about which human „knows”.

Acts of will are given in the current experience of causative power and are preserved in one’s aspiration. Their diagnosing requires techniques, which can be defined as *q u a l i t a t i v e m e t h o d s*. Measurement of this type of quality is specific. It is the >measurement< of the way in which human experiences relations they participate in. The tendency to choose particular relations, meaning both intrinsic and instrumental relations, as proper for oneself (therefore “valuable”) is the subject of the diagnosis based on the Vocational Picture Test created by M. Achtnich (Achtnich, 2010).

Talents as career capital

The Socratic „know your own self” can be interpreted in different ways. Two perspectives appear. „What” can I do? – „Who” am I?

It might seem that from „what” I can do one could draw conclusions about who I am. In his „Phaedrus” Plato rejects this way. One can decide on objects of wanting and want those objects. Then the object of wanting is moved aside by wanting of an object. It can be wanting of things, money. It is the domination of „logic” of things.

K. Ajdukiewicz (1965) presented the view that logic of description and explanation of life is different from logic of things. The logic which directs thinking connected with acting on things is the logic of sufficient conditions; knowledge of these conditions allows for manipulating things. Sufficient conditions are not

usually qualities or states of the subject, but states of things or knowledge about things. This knowledge allows for efficient acting on things and „development” of things. It also allows for prediction of the ways in which people act on things.

The logic of life is the logic of necessary conditions. It is a logic necessary in thinking about acting of the subject as a person. Therefore explanation of human activity requires a model of this activity. In model which assumes that a human is an active participant to the world they live in, relations of dependence become increasingly important as they condition this participation and development. These are the relations of dependence mentioned by Plato, who focuses attention of his interlocutor Phaedrus on getting to know oneself, that is one's talents (Platon, 1993). These talents are becoming career capital (Bańka, 2007).

Paying attention to choices and stressing their specificity, which consists in their location in the world of desires and strivings, provides the answer to the most fundamental questions connected with the sense of activity in the labor market. As I have already mentioned, apart from problems which consist in „material security”, there are problems of friendly relations at work and professional development. Professional development requires relying on one's own talents understood as psychological resources, which can be utilized in the labor market. From this perspective a working person is perceived not only as an employer, but also as an investor who capitalizes their ability to act in the labor market.

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